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Abstract
The problem of Private Information Retrieval (PIR) from coded storage systems with colluding,
byzantine, and unresponsive servers is considered. An explicit scheme using an [n, k] Reed-Solomon
storage code is designed, protecting against t-collusion and handling up to b byzantine and r unresponsive
servers, when n > k+ t+ 2b+ r− 1. This scheme achieves a PIR rate of n−r−(k+2b+t−1)n−r . In the case
where the capacity is known, namely when k = 1, it is asymptotically capacity-achieving as the number
of files grows. Lastly, the scheme is adapted to symmetric PIR.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) is concerned with designing schemes for a user to retrieve a
certain file from a storage system without revealing the identity of the file to the servers. This problem
was introduced by Chor et al. in [2], where the database was viewed as an M -bit binary string x =
This paper was presented in part at the 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT) [1].
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2[x1 · · ·xM ] ∈ {0, 1}M from which the user wants to retrieve one bit xi while keeping the index i hidden
from the server. In this work, we consider files encoded and stored on n servers, and assume that the user
wants to retrieve some file xi from the storage system, without revealing the index i. We assume a system
with t-collusion, wherein any t of the n servers may collude in an attempt to deduce the desired file
index. We additionally assume the presence of b byzantine servers, which return erroneous information,
and r unresponsive servers, which do not return any information at all.
The download rate, PIR rate, or simply rate of a PIR scheme in this model is measured as the ratio of
the size of the downloaded file to the total amount of downloaded data; upload costs of the requests are
ignored. As with the large majority of information-theoretic work on PIR, the rate will be our primary
metric for judging the efficiency of a PIR scheme.
Initially, PIR constructions served to reduce the total download cost from a storage system with data
replicated on multiple servers [3]–[8]. More recently, PIR schemes were constructed on coded data. The
authors in [9] show that downloading one extra bit is enough to achieve privacy, if the number of servers
is exponential in the number of files. In [10], the authors derive bounds on the tradeoff between storage
cost and download cost for linearly coded data. The optimal upper bounds on PIR rate for maximum
distance separable (MDS) coded data were derived in [11]. PIR schemes for MDS coded storage that
achieve the asymptotic optimal download cost for specific numbers of colluding servers were presented
in [12]. For the case of any number of colluding servers, the authors in [13] constructed a new family of
PIR schemes on Reed-Solomon (RS) coded data achieving a lower download cost than the ones in [12].
PIR schemes on arbitrary linear storage codes were constructed in [14]. The notion of symmetric PIR,
where the user is allowed to gain no information about the non-requested files, was studied in [15], [16].
In [8], it is shown that the asymptotic PIR capacity for replicated data, as the number of files M →∞,
for a fixed number of colluding servers t, is n−tn , where n is the number of nodes. When the data is coded
using an [n, k] MDS code, it was shown in [11] that the asymptotic capacity is n−kn . Codes achieving
this PIR rate were first presented in [12].
The problem of constructing PIR schemes on replicated data in which some servers can be byzantine
(malicious) was considered in [17]–[19]. The asymptotic capacity of PIR on replicated storage systems
with t colluding servers and b byzantine servers was found in [20] to be n−(2b+t)n . In [21], the authors
investigate the problem of providing symmetric PIR from a replicated system with colluding servers
and adversaries in the system. A PIR scheme on coded data with colluding and either byzantine or
unresponsive servers was constructed in [22]. PIR from unsynchronized servers was studied in [23],
where the files are stored on multiple servers, while some servers might not be updated to the latest
version, an adaptive PIR scheme is constructed for the user to retrieve privately the file they require. The
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3setting of unsynchronized servers in [23] is similar to the byzantine servers since in both cases some
servers are giving erroneous responds. Compared to the present paper, the work in [23] is more restrictive
and uses an adaptive scheme.
Main Contributions: In this paper, we construct a PIR scheme with servers storing data coded using
a Reed-Solomon code, with up to t colluding servers, b byzantine servers, and r unresponsive servers.
We improve the PIR rate from [1] in the case where k does not divide n− 2b− r− t+ 1. Provided that
n > k + t+ 2b+ r − 1, our scheme achieves a PIR rate of
n− r − (k + t+ 2b− 1)
n− r . (1)
Specializing to the case of r = b = 0, we achieve a rate n−(k+t−1)n , which coincides with the rate achieved
in [13]. Finally, the scheme is adapted to symmetric PIR, where the rate is optimal in the known cases
in terms of achieving the bounds given in [15], [16], [21].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Basic Definitions
We consider a storage system with n servers storing M files f1, . . . , fM , where each file is a matrix
of size L× k over a finite field F. We refer to L as the number of stripes in the file.
f i =

f i1
...
f iL
 =

f i1,0 · · · f i1,k−1
...
. . .
...
f iL,0 · · · f iL,k−1
 . (2)
Each file f i is encoded using an [n, k] linear code C over F in the following way. Let GC ∈ Fk×n be a
generator matrix of C. Then the encoded file yi is given by yi = f i · GC , a matrix of size L × n. The
encoded files are distributed across the n servers by defining
f1
...
fM
 ·GC =

y1
...
yM
 = ( y1 · · · yn ) , yj ∈ FLM×1.
The vector yj is then stored on server j, for j = 1, . . . , n.
The PIR problem for the above encoded storage system can be described as follows. A user wishes to
download a file f i without revealing the index i to any server. To do this, the user generates, according
to some distribution, queries qj : FLM → FS for some S (whose nature will be made precise shortly),
and sends qj to server j. The server responds with the value rj = qj(yj), and the desired file f i can be
computed as a deterministic function of the rj .
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4To better visualize PIR schemes, we will describe them as happening over S rounds or iterations.
During the sth round, the user sends the function q(s)j : FLM → F to server j, who responds with
r
(s)
j = q
(s)
j (yj). During each round, we assume the presence of b byzantine servers, who will instead
respond with an arbitrary element of F, as well as the presence of r unresponsive servers, whose responses
is replaced with an erasure symbol ?. The erasure symbol ? is absorbing with respect to addition, in the
sense that ? + x =? for all x ∈ F. The identities of the servers which are byzantine and unresponsive is
allowed to change from round to round. During round s, we can write the total response vector as
r(s) + ε = (r
(s)
1 , . . . , r
(s)
n ) + ε
where ε is a vector containing at most r erasure symbols and at most b non-zero elements of F.
A PIR scheme as described above protects against t-collusion, or is t-private, if for every subset
T = {j1, . . . , jT } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of servers of size |T | = t, we have
I(i; qj1 , . . . , qjT ) = 0
Our principal metric of efficiency of a PIR scheme is the download rate, or simply rate, defined as
R =
Lk
S(n− r)
which is the ratio of the size of the desired file to the amount of total downloaded data. We assume the
maximum number r of servers are unresponsive during each round of the scheme, hence the number of
downloaded symbols in total in one round will be n− r.
B. Reed-Solomon Codes
From now on, we assume that |F| ≥ n. Let α1, . . . , αn be n distinct elements of F. Let k ≤ n and
consider the space F[z]<k of all single-variable polynomials of degree < k. We define an evaluation map
eval : F[z]→ Fn, eval(f(z)) = (f(α1), . . . , f(αn)) ∈ Fn.
The Reed-Solomon code RS[n, k] is the image of F[z]<k under this map:
RS[n, k] = {eval(f(z)) : f(z) ∈ F[z]<k}.
The code RS[n, k] is MDS. If we write f(z) = f0 + f1z + · · ·+ fk−1zk−1, then
eval(f(z)) = (f0 f1 · · · fk−1) ·GRS[n,k], where GRS[n,k] =
(
αij
)
0≤i≤k−1
1≤j≤n
,
hence the Vandermonde matrix GRS[n,k] is a generator matrix of RS[n, k]. We denote the inverse of
eval on RS[n, k] by dec, which performs polynomial interpolation to recover f(z) from the vector of
evaluations:
dec : RS[n, k]→ F[z]<k
September 6, 2018 DRAFT
5NOMENCLATURE
n Number of servers
C [n, k] storage code
D [n, t] query code
M Number of files
t Number of colluding servers
b Number of byzantine servers
r Number of unresponsive server
S Number of rounds
L Number of stripes / rows in file matrix
ρ Number of symbols retrieved per round
The maps eval and dec are vector space isomorphisms between RS[n, k] and F[z]<k.
C. Storage Systems from Reed-Solomon Codes
We will consider storage codes C which are Reed-Solomon codes: C = RS[n, k]. Given a file f i, the
k information symbols of row f i,` are encoded as coefficients of a polynomial
f i`(z) = f
i
`,0 + f
i
`,1z + · · ·+ f i`,k−1zk−1 (3)
of degree < k. This polynomial is evaluated at n different points α1, · · · , αn ∈ F, and the evaluations
of these polynomials at αj are stored on server j. Therefore, the matrix yi = f i ·GRS[n,k] is of the form
yi =

f i1(α1) · · · f i1(αn)
...
. . .
...
f iL(α1) · · · f iL(αn)

and the contents yj of server j are the length LM column vector
yj =
(
f11 (αj), . . . , f
1
L(αj), . . . , f
M
1 (αj), . . . , f
M
L (αj)
)T
.
We remark that all schemes presented in this work can be used for storage systems using generalized
Reed-Solomon codes as well, but we restrict the description to RS codes for simplicity.
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6III. A PIR SCHEME FOR COLLUDING BYZANTINE SERVERS
A. A Simple Example
We start with an example which shows how the scheme works. In the following subsection we will
describe the scheme in its full generality, but the present example suffices to convey the basic ideas.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
R
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d
om
n
es
s
f i
h(1)
f i
h(1)h(2)
Round 1
Round 2
Fig. 1: Retrieval scheme construction for Example 1
Example 1. Suppose we have a system with parameters n = 9, k = 4, t = b = r = 1. Our storage code
C is an [9, 4] Reed-Solomon code. Let α be the evaluation vector of the Reed-Solomon code. To correct
the errors and erasures, we require that the responses live in a code with a minimum distance of at least
2b + r + 1 = 4, and thus can tolerate b errors and r erasures. Our files will have L = 1 row and our
scheme will require S = 2 rounds.
Suppose that we want to download f i. In each round we will recover exactly ρ := n−k−t+1−2b−r =
2 symbols of file f i. We see that in this example f i only has one row, hence
f i(z) = f i1,0 + f
i
1,1z + f
i
1,2z
2 + f i1,3z
3 (4)
= hi,(2)(z) + hi,(1)(z)z2 (5)
f i (z)
hi,(1)(z) hi,(2)(z)
Fig. 2: Divisions for Example 1
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7where hi,(1)(z) = f i1,2 + f
i
1,3z and h
i,(2)(z) = f i1,0 + f
i
1,1z, as depicted in Figure 2. In round s of the
scheme we will download the coefficients of hi,(s)(z), which comprise ρ symbols of the desired file, see
Figure 1.
In round 1 we choose a random coefficient/constant polynomial dm,(1) for every file fm, 1 ≤ m ≤M .
For the requested file f i we add the monomial z2 to di,(1). In other words, define
q(1)(z) = (q1,(1)(z), . . . , qM,(1)(z)), where qm,(1)(z) =
 dm,(1) if m 6= idm,(1) + z2 if m = i
and the query qj sent to the jth server is given by
q
(1)
j = q
(1)(αj) = (q
1,(1)(αj), . . . , q
M,(1)(αj)) =
 dm,(1) if m 6= idm,(1) + α2j if m = i .
Before the addition of errors and erasures induced by the byzantine and unresponsive servers, the response
from server j is
r
(1)
j = 〈q(1)j , yj〉 =
M∑
m=1
qm,(1)(αj)f
m(αj) (6)
=
M∑
m=1
dm,(1)fm(αj) + α
2
jf
i(αj) . (7)
The vector r(1) = (r(1)1 , . . . , r
(1)
n ) consisting of all of the responses from the n servers is therefore
r(1) = eval(r(1)(z)), where r(1)(z) =
M∑
m=1
dm,(1)fm(z) + z2f i(z) .
Since deg(r(1)(z)) ≤ 5, we see that r(1) is an element of a Reed-Solomon code with parameters [9, 6]
with minimum distance 4, and can thus tolerate the one error and one erasure introduced by the byzantine
and unresponsive servers.
Expanding the polynomial r(1)(z), we have
r(1)(z) =
M∑
m=1
dm,(1)fm(z) + z2f i(z) (8)
=
M∑
m=1
dm,(1)fm(z) + hi,(2)(z)z2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:g(z), deg≤3
+hi,(1)(z)z4 . (9)
Since deg(g(z)) ≤ 3, we have that eval(g(z)) ∈ C. Therefore, we can recover the coefficients of hi,1(z),
namely f i1,2 and f
i
1,3, from the response vector r
(1).
In round 2, we again sample M constant polynomials dm,(2) and set
q(2)(z) = (q1,(2)(z), . . . , qM,(2)(z)), where qm,(2)(z) =
 dm,(2) if m 6= idm,(2) + z4 if m = i .
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8A similar calculation as in the first round shows that the total response vector r(2) in the second round,
before the addition of errors and erasures, is r(2) = eval(r(2)(z)), where
r(2)(z) =
M∑
m=1
dm,(1)fm(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
deg≤3
+hi,(2)(z)z4 + hi,(1)(z)z6︸ ︷︷ ︸
known from round 1
. (10)
The user receives eval(r(2)(z)) plus a vector consisting of errors and erasures. From round 1, the user
knows hi,(1)(z), and before correcting for errors and erasures can subtract eval(hi,(1)(z)z6) from what
they receive. What is left is a codeword of a Reed-Solomon code which can correct the errors and erasures
as in round 1. Again as in round 1, the user reads off the coefficients of hi,(2)(z), namely f i1,0 and f
i
1,1.
The user now has all of the coefficients of f i and can reconstruct the entire file. The rate of this scheme
is clearly seen to be
n− r − (k + t+ 2b− 1)
n− r =
ρ
n− r =
2
8
=
1
4
.
B. The General Scheme
. . .d
eg
re
e
0 1 k
+
t
−
2
n
−
2b
−
r
. . .
ρ
R
an
d
om
n
es
s
Round 1
f i1
h(1)
Round 2
f i2
h(2)
f i1
h(1)
Round S
f iL
h(S)
. . . f
i
2
h(2)
f i1
h(1)
known from previous rounds
retrieved in current round
...
...
Fig. 3: A PIR scheme from an [n, k] storage code with t colluding, b byzantine, and r unresponsive
servers for ρ < k.
Let ρ := n−(k+t+2b+r−1). We choose the parameters L and S to be minimal such that Lk = Sρ,
that is,
L =
lcm(ρ, k)
k
, S =
lcm(ρ, k)
ρ
.
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9Our scheme requires that
n > k + t+ 2b+ r − 1, (11)
and the rate of our scheme will be given by
ρ
n− r =
n− k − t− 2b− r + 1
n− r , (12)
in other words, ρ is the number of symbols retrieved during each round of the protocol.
To correct the b errors and r erasures from the byzantine and non-responsive servers, our scheme
will be constructed so that the response vector r(s) during round s is an element of an affine shift of a
Reed-Solomon code with minimum distance d = 2b + r + 1. The vector by which the Reed-Solomon
code is shifted is known to the user during each round, allowing one to correct for the b errors and r
erasures.
For every round s, we choose i.i.d. uniform codewords from the query code D = RS[n, t], as the
evaluation of polynomials dm,(s)` (z), for every row ` of every file m. For the rows of file i we add the
evaluation of another polynomial to the query, such that the polynomial hi,(s)(z) can be retrieved in
round s, as represented in Figure 3. Explicitly, we let
ex(z) =
z
x if x ≥ t
0 otherwise.
and add the evaluation of
esρ−`k+k+t−1(z) (13)
to the entries of the query corresponding to the `th row of file i in round s. Our query polynomials are
then defined as
q
m,(s)
` (z) :=
d
m,(s)
` (z) + esρ+(1−`)k+t−1(z) if m = i
d
m,(s)
` (z) if m 6= i .
(14)
Note that deg(qm,(s)` (z)) ≤ t− 1 for m 6= i, and hence deg(fm` (z)qm,(s)` (z)) ≤ k + t− 2. Furthermore,
in round 1, deg(qi,(1)` (z)) ≤ n − 2b − r − k. During round s, the user sends the vector qj to server j,
where
q
(s)
j =
(
q
1,(s)
1 (αj), . . . , q
1,(s)
L (αj), . . . , q
M,(s)
1 (αj), . . . , q
M,(s)
L (αj)
)
∈ FLM ,
thus the user sends to server j all the evaluations of the query polynomials qm,(s)` (z) at z = αj .
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In round s, before the addition of the errors and erasures due to the byzantine and unresponsive servers,
the response r(s)j from server j is given by
r
(s)
j = 〈q(s)j , yj〉 (15)
=
M∑
m=1
L∑
`=1
q
m,(s)
` (αj)f
m
` (αj) (16)
=
M∑
m=1
L∑
`=1
d
m,(s)
` (αj)f
m
` (αj) +
L∑
`=1
esρ−`k+k+t−1(αj)f i`(αj) . (17)
Note that sρ− `k + k + t− 1 ≥ t⇔ ` ≤ dsρ/ke, therefore the above is equal to
=
M∑
m=1
L∑
`=1
d
m,(s)
` (αj)f
m
` (αj) +
dsρ/ke∑
`=1
αsρ−`k+k+t−1j f
i
`(αj) . (18)
The second summand in the above illustrates that during round s, the response involves rows 1, . . . , dsρ/ke.
The total response vector (before the addition of errors and erasures) during round s is therefore r(s) =
(r
(s)
1 , . . . , r
(s)
n ) = eval(r(s)(z)), where
r(s)(z) =
M∑
m=1
L∑
`=1
d
m,(s)
` (z)f
m
` (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:g(s)(z), deg(g(s))<k+t−1
+
dsρ/ke∑
`=1
zsρ−`k+k+t−1f i`(z) . (19)
We will refer to r(s)(z) as the response polynomial during round s.
To best illustrate why we can recover ρ information symbols from the above response, we first consider
what happens in round s = 1. The response polynomial during round 1 is
r(1)(z) = g(1)(z) +
dρ/ke∑
`=1
zρ−`k+k+t−1f i`(z) (20)
= g(1)(z) + zk+t−1
dρ/ke−1∑
`=1
zρ−`kf i`(z) + z
ρ−dρ/kek+k+t−1f idρ/ke(z) . (21)
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Expressing the last summand as two terms, one of which has degree < k + t − 1, and one which has
degree ≥ k + t− 1 yields
= g(1)(z) + zk+t−1
dρ/ke−1∑
`=1
zρ−`kf i`(z)
+
dρ/kek−ρ−1∑
κ=0
f idρ/ke,κz
ρ−dρ/kek+k+t−1+κ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:γ(z), deg(γ(z))<k+t−1
+ zk+t−1
k−1∑
κ=dρ/kek−ρ
f idρ/ke,κz
ρ−dρ/kek+κ (22)
= g(1)(z) + γ(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
deg<k+t−1
+ zk+t−1
 k−1∑
κ=dρ/kek−ρ
f idρ/ke,κz
ρ−dρ/kek+κ +
dρ/ke−1∑
`=1
zρ−`kf i`(z)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:hi,(1)(z)
. (23)
From (20) we see that deg(r(1)(z)) < ρ+k+ t−1 = n− (2b+ r), therefore eval(r(1)(z)) is a codeword
in a Reed-Solomon code with minimum distance 2b + r + 1. Hence the user can correct up to b errors
and r erasures introduced by the byzantine and unresponsive servers.
After correcting errors and erasures, the user obtains from the above expression the k coefficients of
the polynomials f i`(z) for ` = 1, . . . , dρ/ke − 1, and when ` = dρ/ke, we obtain from the polynomial
f idρ/ke(z) the coefficients f
i
dρ/ke,κ for κ = dρ/kek − ρ, . . . , k − 1. Thus ρ information symbols are
downloaded in the first round.
Now consider round s. We define polynomials hi,(s)(z) of degree < ρ by the following recursive
formula. The polynomial hi,(1)(z) is defined as in (23), and for s > 1 we define them recursively via the
formula
r(s)(z) = g(s)(z) + zk+t−1
s∑
σ=1
zρ(s−σ)hi,(σ)(z). (24)
where deg(g(s)(z)) < k+ t−1. Note that the hi,(s)(z) depend only on the file f i and not the randomness
present in the queries. Picking off the polynomials whose coefficients we know from previous rounds,
we can write
r(s)(z) = g(s)(z) + zk+t−1hi,(s)(z) + zk+t−1
s−1∑
σ=1
zρ(s−σ)hi,(σ)(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
known from rounds 1, . . . , s− 1
.
The user receives eval(r(s)(z)) plus errors and erasures. First subtracting off the evaluation of the known
summands in the above, we arrive at a codeword in the same Reed-Solomon code as in round 1, which
allows us to correct errors and erasures. The user then recovers the ρ coefficients of the polynomial
hi,(s)(z).
September 6, 2018 DRAFT
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... f i1(z)f i2(z)f i3(z)f iL(z)
... hi,(1)(z)hi,(2)(z)hi,(3)(z)hi,(4)(z)hi,(S)(z)
Fig. 4: The coefficients of the polynomials f i,` lined up into L packages of size k each (above) and into
S packages of size ρ each (below).
To prove that this suffices to download the whole file, consider the response polynomial r(S)(z) in
round S. Equating the expressions (19) and (24) for r(S)(z), we arrive at the equality
r(S)(z) = g(S)(z) + zk+t−1
L∑
`=1
z(L−`)kf i`(z) = g
(S)(z) + zk+t−1
S∑
s=1
z(S−s)ρhi,(s)(z)
or equivalently,
L∑
`=1
z(L−`)kf i`(z) =
S∑
s=1
z(S−s)ρhi,(s)(z)
which shows that the hi,(s)(z) determine the polynomials f i`(z) completely, as depicted in Fig. 4.
The achieved rate by this scheme is easily seen to be
R =
Lk
S(n− r) =
ρ
n− r =
n− r − (k + t+ 2b− 1)
n− r . (25)
The scheme is t-private since the retrieval code D is MDS of dimension t, the proof is identical to the
proof of privacy in [13].
Example 2. Suppose we have the parameters n = 14, k = 4, t = 2, r = 1, b = 1. We construct a scheme
that achieves a PIR rate of 6/13. We can retrieve ρ = 6 symbols per round, and require L = 3 rows per
file and S = 2 rounds of the scheme. Thus, we decompose the file in two ways as
3∑
`=1
z4(3−`)f i,`(z) =
2∑
s=1
z6(2−s)hi,s(z) (26)
as shown in Figure 5.
We pick the retrieval code D = RS[14, 2]. In round s = 1, we sample i.i.d. uniform codewords
eval(d
m,(1)
` (z)) ∈ D. The query polynomials qi,(1)` (z) are given by
q
i,(1)
` (z) =

d
i,(1)
1 (z) + z
7 if ` = 1
d
i,(1)
2 (z) + z
3 if ` = 2
d
i,(1)
3 (z) if ` = 3.
The response polynomial r(1)(z) is of the form
r(1)(z) = g(1)(z) + f i2,2z
5 + f i2,3z
6 + f i1(z)z
7 = g(1)(z) + hi,(1)(z)z5
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f i1(z)f i2(z)f i3(z)
hi,(1)(z)hi,(2)(z)
Fig. 5: Coefficients lined up into L = 3 packages of size k = 4 each (above) and S = 2 packages of
size ρ = 6 each (below) in Example 2.
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Fig. 6: Retrieval scheme for Example 2.
where deg(g(1)(z)) < k+ t− 1 = 5, which allows us to download the four coefficients of f i1(z) plus the
two additional coefficients of f i2(z). In round two, the response polynomial r
(2)(z) is of the form
r(2)(z) = g(2)(z) + f i3(z)z
5 + f i2,0z
9 + f i2,1z
10 + hi,(1)z11 = g(2)(z) + hi,(2)(z)z5 + hi,(1)z11︸ ︷︷ ︸
known from first round
from which we obtain the coefficients of hi,(2)(z), as shown in Figure 6.
IV. COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS PIR SCHEMES AND A SYMMETRIC VARIANT
A. Comparison with Other Work on PIR with Byzantine and Unresponsive Servers and Coded Data
Recently, Zhang and Ge [22] constructed a PIR scheme for coded data and colluding servers, which
is adaptable for unresponsive and byzantine servers (but not for both simultaneously). In this section
we briefly compare the rates obtained in this paper with those of [22] in the asymptotic regime as
M → ∞. The scheme of [22] only achieves positive rates assuming certain inequalities in the basic
system parameters are satisfied, namely the obvious inequalities which guarantee that the expressions
below in (27) and (28) are positive. To compare the two schemes at their best, we grant this assumption.
When b = 0 and r > 0, the asymptotic rate as M →∞ from [22] can be expressed as
R¯ =
n
n− r
((
n−r
k
)
+
(
n−t
k
)− (nk)(
n
k
) ) . (27)
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Fig. 7: The PIR rate versus number of files M when n = 12, k = 2, and t = 3 following the scheme in [22] and
the scheme in this paper.
An elementary calculation shows that R¯ < n−r−(k+t−1)n−r , the rate obtained for the scheme described in
the previous sections. In the case where b > 0 and r = 0, the asymptotic rate obtained in [22] is
R¯ =
2
((
n−b
k
)− (nk))+ (n−tk )(
n
k
) (28)
which, again by a simple argument, is less than n−(k+t+2b−1)n , the rate obtained by the proposed scheme
in this case.
Lastly, we remark that the rates obtained in [22] decrease with an increasing number of files, while
the rates we obtain are constant in the number of files. As noted in [22], the rates therein outperform
those of [13] for a small number of files. We can see from Figure 7 that the same holds here for these
example parameters.
B. A Symmetric Variant
A PIR scheme is symmetric if the user, while retrieving the requested file f i, gains no information
about any of the other files f i
′
for i 6= i′. To construct a symmetric variant of our scheme, we assume the
servers have access to a joint source of randomness. Each round, the joint source of randomness outputs
a uniform random codeword pi(s) = eval(pi(s)(z)), where pi(s)(z) ∈ F[z]<k+t−1.
The scheme proceeds exactly as before, though all servers compute r(s)j = 〈q(s)j , yj〉 + pi(s)j , which
the responsive, non-byzantine servers transmit back to the user. As before, the user receives an erasure
symbol from the unresponsive servers, and a arbitrary element of F from the byzantine servers. Since
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deg(pi(s)(z)) < k+ t− 1, it is absorbed into the ‘randomness’ term g(s)(z) and therefore does not affect
how the user recovers the ρ information symbols. Since pi(s)(z) is uniformly chosen, there is clearly no
information leaked about any files f i
′
for i′ 6= i.
We note that this is the same amount of randomness needed to symmetrize the scheme of [15], which
deals with the case of b = r = 0, as well as in the scheme of [21], which deals with the case k = 1.
C. Conjectures
We venture the following conjectures regarding the asymptotic and symmetric capacities of this PIR
problem.
Conjecture 1. The asymptotic capacity (as M →∞) of Private Information Retrieval for an [n, k] MDS
storage code with t-collusion, b byzantine servers, and r unresponsive servers is n−r−(k+t+2b−1)n−r . That
is, the current scheme is asymptotically capacity-achieving.
Conjecture 2. The capacity of Symmetric Private Information Retrieval for an [n, k] MDS storage
code with t-collusion, b byzantine servers, and r unresponsive servers is n−r−(k+t+2b−1)n−r . That is, the
symmetrization of the current scheme is capacity-achieving.
Furthermore, to guarantee symmetry, the minimum entropy per round required for the shared random-
ness amongst the servers is k + t− 1 (in q-ary units).
V. CONCLUSION
A PIR scheme was presented in this paper which can simultaneously handle coded data and colluding,
unresponsive servers, and byzantine servers. In the current work, the response from the servers is an
element of a linear code which allows the user to correct for the erasures and errors produced by
the unresponsive and byzantine servers. The scheme has rate n−r−(k+2b+t−1)n−r , which is equal to the
asymptotic capacity (as the number of files goes to infinity) in all cases where the capacity is known.
The scheme compares favorably to previous schemes which account for unresponsive and byzantine
servers. Additionally, the scheme is easily symmetrizable.
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